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2horizontally and vertically polarized photons in modes a














At rst glance, the above scheme seems to require a quan-
tum non-demolition (QND) measurement of the photon
number on each side in order to project onto a xed value












without losing the pos-













wards. Ways of realizing such a QND measurement were
discussed in [5], but it is denitely not easy to implement.
On the other hand, destructive photon counting is fea-
sible. It is therefore important to realize that for many
applications it is not strictly necessary to perform the n































The basis of polarization analysis can be varied, allowing
one to infer the projected value of n as well as extract
information about the entanglement. This approach is
similar to the post-selection strategy that enabled the
demonstration of quantum teleportation [10] and related
single-photon experiments.
Clearly, one should be careful in referring to a post-
selection method as a concentration scheme since no con-
centrated output state is obtained. However, for the pur-
pose of quantum cryptography the post-selection method
will suce, since it allows to establish perfect correlations
between Alice's and Bob's measurement results.
For quantum key distribution, it is not sucient to
have perfect correlations in one specic basis. To pre-
vent eavesdropping it is important that perfect correla-
tions are also obtained in another complementary basis.
We now show that, due to our specic choice of relative
phases, the state (3) is rotational symmetric and there-
fore exhibits the same photon-number dierence correla-
tions in, for example, the linear polarization basis rotated
by 45
Æ
. We also show how the state (3) can be gen-
erated in a natural way using type-II parametric down-
conversion.
Parametric down-conversion is a process where a pho-
ton from a pump light source can be split into two pho-
tons of lower frequency within a non-linear optical crys-
tal. One can experimentally achieve conditions where a

















) + h:c:; (5)
where the complex number  is the product of the am-
plitude of the pump beam and the relevant non-linear
coecient of the crystal. This is the familiar Hamilto-
nian for the creation of polarization entangled photon
pairs [2], which has been the basis for many experiments
in quantum information. Using the normal ordering the-
orem of [11] one can show that this Hamiltonian leads to
the production of entangled photon states of the follow-
ing form:

























































j(n m);m; m; (n m)i :(7)
The total state (6) has exactly the form of state (3).
The terms j 
n
 
i, which correspond to n photons on each
side, are maximally entangled states shared between Al-
ice and Bob in a Hilbert space of (n + 1)  (n + 1) di-
mensions. Similar states were studied in the context of
Bell's inequalities in [12]. They are all invariant under
joint identical polarization transformations by Alice and
Bob, since they are created by the application to the vac-















is conserved under such transformations. These proper-
ties make them generalized singlet states, which moti-
vates our notation j 
n
 
i. Whenever Alice has (n   m)
photons polarized along a certain direction and m pho-
tons polarized along the orthogonal one, Bob has m and
(n   m) photons of the respective polarizations. When
employed for quantum key distribution, every pair of val-
ues (m;n m) constitutes a letter in the cryptographical
alphabet.
A simple key distribution protocol using the multi-
photon states proceeds in the following way. From a
common source, entangled multi-photon pulses are sent
to Alice and Bob via modes a and b. Alice and Bob





, in which to perform their photon num-
ber measurements. These measurements act as a multi-
photon entanglement concentration resulting in detected
correlations associated to the states j 
n
 
i, where n is the
number of detected photons on each side. They commu-
nicate their basis choice via classical means and extract
the key from the photon number dierence recorded in
those cases where they had chosen the same basis. Fi-
nally they compare a randomly chosen part of the key to
detect whether an eavesdropper has been present. Eaves-
dropping will aect the maximal entanglement and thus
introduce errors.
It is clear that in the absence of losses and errors the
achievable bit rate increases signicantly with the num-
ber of photons because the number of distinguishable re-
sults increases. There are n + 1 dierent possible mea-
surement results for the state j 
n
 
i. For protocols based
on the multi-photon states j 
n
 
i, losses introduce errors
because they aect the entanglement. In quantum key
3distribution, in principle one has to assume that all er-
rors could be due to eavesdropping. The achievable se-
cure bit rate or secrecy capacity [13] C
s
in the presence













is the mutual information between parties X
and Y. The mutual informations and therefore also the
bound on the secrecy capacity depend on the type of
attack employed by the eavesdropper. Determining the
achievable secure bit rates under lossy conditions there-
fore requires an analysis of possible eavesdropping strate-
gies. This is not an easy task in the present situation
since the system under consideration is complex, and the
eectiveness of a particular eavesdropping strategy de-
pends on the precise protocol chosen.
In this paper, as a rst step, we consider a protocol
where Alice and Bob make use of the 4-photon detec-
tion results (each detects 2 photons) in addition to the
2-photon results (each detects 1 photon). We have com-
pared this case to the standard protocol where only the
2-photon results are used [8].
We suppose that Eve's technological capabilities are
so powerful that she can replace the lossy transmission
lines between Alice and Bob by ideal lossless ones. Fur-
thermore, Eve is in control of the source. Sometimes she
simply distributes the states j 
1
 
i and j 
2
 
i to Alice and
Bob, but sometimes she rst performs a measurement on
them in one of the bases utilized by Alice and Bob. The
important constraint on Eve's operations is that in or-
der to avoid being detected she has to pretend to Alice
and Bob that the errors observed by them are actually
caused by losses. Eve mimics a certain combination of
losses and source strength, i.e. eective interaction time
 . Firstly this means that she also has to send signals
containing photon numbers other than 2 and 4 with ap-
propriate probabilities. Secondly she has to choose the
percentage of cases in which she actually performs a mea-
surement on the states j 
1
 
i and j 
2
 
i, such that the level
of errors introduced by her measurement corresponds to
the level of errors expected by Alice and Bob.
Under these conditions one can determine the bound
on the secrecy capacity (8) as a function of the losses and
of  . The results are shown in gure 1. One sees that for
a comparatively low level of losses the secrecy capacity,
or more precisely the lower bound on it, is approximately
doubled by using the 4-photon states in addition. This ef-
fect would be increased substantially by including higher
photon numbers.
It should be noted in this context that highly ecient
photon-counting detectors [14] and optical bres with
very low losses [15] are both under development. At the
present stage, losses and limited detection eciencies are
serious practical restrictions. One can see from g. 1(b)


































FIG. 1: Both graphs show the lower bound Eq. (8) on the
achievable secure bit rate C
s
. In (a) it is plotted as a function
of  and  , where  is the overall transmission, encompassing
limited detection eciency and propagation losses, and  is
the eective interaction time of the source, cf. Eq. (6). The
upper plot of (a) refers to the protocol using both 2-photon
and 4-photon results, while the lower plot is for the standard
protocol using 2-photon results only. One sees that using 4-
photon detections in addition leads to a signicant increase
in secure bit rates in the region of low losses. This is shown
in more detail in (b) where we have plotted the lower bound
on C
s
for both protocols, at their optimal  values;  = 0:78
and  = 0:70 for the new and old protocols respectively. The
bound on C
s
decreases for higher  values, as can be seen
clearly in (a), because the probabilities for 2-photon and 4-
photon results are reduced as higher photon numbers become
more and more likely. Including them would further increase
the achievable bit rates.
higher photon number states disappears for overall losses
that exceed 20 percent. For larger losses the error proba-
bility becomes so high that no secret key can be distilled.
However, there is some indication that the multi-
photon states may still be viable candidates for quan-
tum key distribution for higher losses, if more elaborate
protocols are considered. From the point of view of quan-
tum communication in general, a natural question to ask
is how the entanglement in the considered multi-photon
4states is aected by photon loss. It turns out to be sur-
prisingly robust, as illustrated by the following example.








(j2; 0; 0; 2i  j1; 1; 1; 1i+ j0; 2; 2; 0i) (9)
If the environment does not preferentially absorb pho-
tons of a specic polarization, then the loss of a photon
of unknown polarization in spatial mode a from a state
































) is the normalization con-
stant. Note that because of its scalar-product-like form
the loss map L
a
does not depend on the polarization
basis chosen. It commutes with arbitrary polarization
transformations and thus does not change the symmetry
properties of  under such transformations. The same
holds for the analogously dened map L
b
corresponding
to losing a photon of unknown polarization in spatial
mode b.
Let us now consider the two-photon state that is ob-
tained from the four-photon state j 
2
 
i by losing one pho-












the invariance of j 
2
 
i under bilateral polarization trans-
formations and the above-mentioned symmetric charac-










i.e. it is a two-qubit Werner state, where
j 
 







(j1; 0; 0; 1i  j0; 1; 1; 0i): (12)
The qubits correspond to the two polarization states of
the remaining single photon in either spatial mode.








 = 2=3. Using the well-known partial transposition
criterion for separability [16], one can easily show that
states of the form (11) are entangled for  > 1=3. This











j) still contains a
substantial amount of entanglement, which could e.g. be
distilled to singlet form [17] and then used for cryptog-
raphy or other quantum communication tasks. A poten-
tial method for the purication of polarization entangled
photons has recently been suggested [18].
The inseparability of the two-photon state implies of
course that the states obtained from j 
2
 
i by losing only
one photon are also entangled and distillable. We will
perform a more general analysis of how the entanglement
in the states (6) is aected by photon loss in a future
publication.
There are other natural applications for multi-photon
entanglement besides quantum key distribution, such as
all-optical quantum error correction [19], or even all-
optical quantum computation [20]. The use of the down-
conversion multi-photon states for these purposes is a
topic for future research.
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